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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2-2(4) and its Order dated September 15,2005. (R. 373.) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether, in the absence of a duty imposed by statute or common law, a property 
owner such as Defendant Bank of Utah owes a duty to protect Plaintiff Cameron 
Smith, a bicyclist utilizing a public sidewalk, from a motorist who failed to stop 
her automobile as required by law. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court 
reviews the trial court's legal rulings for correctness. Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 
303, f 8, P.3d ("Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we review 
the trial court's ruling on legal issues for correctness. We determine only whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there 
were no disputed issues of material fact.") 
Preservation: This issue of whether a duty was owed by Bank of Utah to Plaintiff 
was preserved through the district court's ruling on Bank of Utah's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 00107 & 109 (Bank of Utah's Mot. Summ. J. and Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. 
J.); and R. 281 (Reply Mem.)). The district court ruled that Bank of Utah owed no duty of 
care to the Plaintiff as a matter of law and was therefore entitled to summary judgment. (R. 
1 
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365 (Minute Entry), and R. 366 (Order Granting Def. Bank of Utah's Mot. Summ. J.)). See 
Spears v. Warn 2002 UT 24, f 11,44 P.3d 742 ("By [the district court] ruling on the question, 
the . . . issue has been sufficiently preserved for [appellate] review."); see also Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998).1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Among other things, the parties disagree as to the applicability of Utah Code Section 
41-6-19. The accident occurred on March 31,2003, and therefore the version of Section 41-
6-19 in effect at the time, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19 (2003), is attached as Addendum A. 
The correct application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 368, 343 and 343A are 
likewise at issue in this case and attached as Addenda to Plaintiffs brief. There are no 
constitutional provisions, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant/Plaintiff Cameron Smith ("Plaintiff) was involved in an automobile-
bicycle accident on the sidewalk of Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. Plaintiff was 
riding his bicycle on the sidewalk, but against the flow of street traffic. Defendant 
Phounsabath Phitsnoukanh ("Defendant Phitsnoukanh"), a patron of Appellee/Defendant 
1
 Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, the issue is preserved through the district court' s 
ruling and not through the notice of appeal and docketing statement. (See Br. of PL at 2). 
2 
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Bank of Utah "(Bank of Utah" or "Bank"), was exiting the drive-through teller in her 
automobile. Defendant Phitsnoukanh and Plaintiff collided on the public sidewalk where the 
exit from the drive-through teller enters Washington Boulevard. Plaintiff settled his 
negligence claim against Defendant Phitsnoukanh. 
In addition to recovering from Defendant Phitsnoukanh, Plaintiff also sued the Bank 
of Utah who he claims owed him and other pedestrians using the public sidewalk in front of 
the Bank a duty of care. Defendant Phitsnoukanh and Plaintiff settled their dispute. At the 
close of discovery, Bank of Utah moved the trial court for summary judgment requesting the 
trial court to decide as a matter of law that Bank of Utah did not owe a duty to protect 
Plaintiff from a negligent motorist. The trial court correctly concluded that Bank of Utah 
owed no common law or statutory duty of care to Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals that decision. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following facts are established in the record from the trial court and are material 
to the determination of whether or not Defendant Bank of Utah owed a duty to Plaintiff, a 
bicyclist on a public sidewalk in front of the bank, who was injured by third party motorist. 
1. Plaintiff Cameron Smith was involved in an automobile-bicycle collision on 
the sidewalk of Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. (R. 002, Compl. f7; R. 110, Bank's 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Undisputed Fact ^[1; see also Br. of PI. at 4, f5). 
2. Plaintiff was riding his bicycle north on the sidewalk, against the flow of street 
traffic on the west sidewalk of Washington Boulevard. (R. 002, Compl. \]\ R. 110, Bank's 
3 
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Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Undisputed Factff2-3; R. 162, Pl.s Opp'n Mem. ("Plaintiff was 
traveling north on that sidewalk situated on the west side of Washington Boulevard.")). 
3. Defendant Phounsabath Phitsnoukanh was operating a motor vehicle and 
exiting the drive-through teller at Defendant Bank of Utah, Inc. (R. 002, Compl. f 11; R. 
110, Bank's Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Undisputed Fact % 4; see also Br. of PI. at 3, ^2.) 
4. Plaintiff collided with Defendant Phitsnoukanh where the exit from the drive-
through teller enters Washington Boulevard after she failed to stop at the sidewalk. (R. 002, 
Compl. J 9; R. 110-113, Bank's Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Undisputed Fact fflf 4-12; see 
also Br. of PL at 3 & 4, fl3, 5). 
5. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that "[t]he Bank owes a duty to the public in general 
and this Plaintiff in particular to provide safe passage to the pedestrians who are traversing 
the sidewalk in front of its drive-thru." (R. 003, Compl. f 26.) 
6. The Plaintiff also alleged that the Bank owed him, as a pedestrian passer-by, 
a duty "to design, monitor and control its drive-thru in a safe condition." (R. 003, Compl. 
1125.) 
7. The Plaintiff was not a patron of the Bank. (R. 002, see Compl. Yi 1> 14, 26, 
describing Plaintiff as a member of the public using the sidewalk who should have been 
treated as a pedestrian; see also R. 183). 
8. Defendant Phitsnoukanh was a bank patron. (R. 002, Compl. | 1 1 , 28.) 
9. It is undisputed that Defendant Phitsnoukanh was negligent. (R. 110 - 114, 
4 
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I1f4, 8-12, 15; R. 161-62; R. 367 & 368, ffl[2, 5, & 8; Br. of Appellee at 3 & 4, ffl| 2-4 & 7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court properly concluded that Bank of Utah owed no duty of care to 
Plaintiff who, as a passerby on the public sidewalk in front of the Bank, was injured by an 
automobile driven by a third party. 
Utah courts and other jurisdictions have not imposed a common law duty upon a 
property owner such as Bank of Utah to protect a bicyclist on a public sidewalk who is 
injured by a motorist who breached a duty to stop. The trial court's determination that the 
Bank owed no duty is supported by case law from other jurisdictions, and by sound public 
policy. In addition, there is no special relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant Bank of 
Utah to justify setting aside the general rule in Utah that a party does not have an affirmative 
duty to care for another. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs contention, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 does not 
support imposing a duty because that Section addresses injuries that were caused by "contact 
with" "an excavation or other artificial condition" on the land. No such condition is at issue 
in this case. Moreover, because the facts of this case do not involve actual contact with a 
dangerous instrumentality or hazardous condition on the Bank's property, the cases cited by 
Plaintiff involving injuries on land through contact with an artificial condition are 
inapplicable. Sections §343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are also 
inapplicable because Plaintiff was not an invitee of the Bank. 
5 
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Finally, although the Utah Legislature has imposed a duty of care on both the driver 
of a vehicle emerging from an "alley, building, private road or driveway" and on the bicyclist 
utilizing the public sidewalk to use reasonable care, it has not imposed any statutory duty on 
the property owner, in this case Bank of Utah. Bank of Utah owes no statutory duty to 
remove the "obstruction" that the Plaintiff claims caused the accident, i.e., the bank building 
itself. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19 cannot be reasonably interpreted to require removal of an 
entire building. Construing the statute in light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the statute 
only requires removal of vegetation or other readily removable objects such as debris. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs Complaint against Bank of Utah was properly dismissed by the trial court 
because, as a matter of law, Bank of Utah owed no duty of care to Plaintiff who, as a 
passerby on the public sidewalk in front of the bank, was injured by an automobile driven by 
a third party. The trial court correctly determined that summary judgment was proper 
because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Bank of Utah is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2006). Absent a genuine issue of 
material fact, the court need only decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law; and the district court correctly concluded that Bank of Utah owed no duty 
of care to Plaintiff. Id. 
6 
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I. Utah courts and other jurisdictions have not imposed a duty upon a property 
owner such as Bank of Utah to protect a bicyclist on a public sidewalk who is 
injured by a third party motorist who breached a duty to stop 
To recover in negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) duty, (2) breach 
of that duty, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. See, e.g.. Webb v. University of 
Utah. 2005 UT 80, | 9 , 125 P.3d 906; Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). 
It is well-established that "[w]ithout a duty, there can be no negligence as a matter of law, 
and summary judgment is appropriate." Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores Inc. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.. 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1994); see also, e.g.. Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 
413, 415 (Utah 1986). 
Whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is "entirely a question of law to 
be determined by the court." Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); accord Lamarr 
v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
A. There is no common law duty imposed on a property owner to protect a 
passing bicyclist on a sidewalk from a negligent motorist 
Plaintiff lacks any case law supporting his contention that a property owner has a duty 
to prevent an accident between a passing pedestrian and a vehicle negligently exiting the 
property. Other jurisdictions that have addressed this circumstance have agreed that no duty 
is owed by a landowner to a passerby where the passerby is injured by third party motorist. 
A virtually identical case is Ziemba v. Mierzwa. 566 N.E.2d 1365 (111. 1991), in which 
the Illinois Supreme Court held that a landowner owed no duty to warn a passing bicyclist 
of a hidden driveway. In Ziemba. a bicyclist was injured by a dump truck exiting a driveway. 
7 
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Id. at 1365. In addition to alleging that the driver of the truck was negligent in exiting 
without warning and without yielding the right of way, the bicyclist also alleged that the 
landowner owed a duty to maintain his property "so as to not cause damage or injury to 
persons on the adjacent roadway." Id at 1366. The bicyclist also alleged various ways in 
which he thought the landowner breached this duty, including permitting ingress and egress 
where he should have known that the exit was not readily visible to passers-by; and 
"[allowing foliage . . . to . . . obstruct the vision of persons [exiting the property]." Id. The 
court then went on to state that "the conditions on defendant's land only posed a danger to 
plaintiff by operation of the driver's intervening negligent act." Id. at 1368. The court 
explained that the obstructed vision of the exit did "not affect the determination of 
foreseeability that the driver would violate his own statutory duty," id. at 1368, and that the 
defendant property owner "had a right to expect that the [vehicle exiting the premises] would 
check for oncoming traffic before entering [the road]." Id. 
The Ziemba court quoted prior case law noting that a property owner cannot control 
the drivers of vehicles leaving its premises, and the property owner has a right to expect 
drivers of cars to look before they exit. Id. at 1369 (quoting Zimmerman v. Netemeyer, 462 
N.E.2d 502 (111. Ct. App. 1984)). In discussing the burden on defendant and society, the 
court that imposing a duty on a landowner to anticipate and guard against the negligence of 
others would "place an intolerable burden on society." Id. (Internal quotation and citation 
omitted). Furthermore, the typical rationale for imposing landowner liability did not exist 
8 
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in this circumstance because it is not the landowner who is in the best position to prevent the 
injury, but the driver of the automobile. Id. The court stated: 
The underlying rationale for [landowner liability] for injuries 
[caused by] conditions on his land is that the landowner is in the 
best position to prevent the injury. [Because] the truck driver 
was in the best position to prevent the injury[,] the usual 
justification for imposing landowner liability is not present[.]" 
Id 
Likewise, in Echorst v. Kaim, 288 A.D.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), New York's 
intermediate court of appeals more recently concluded that no duty was owed by a landowner 
to a bicyclist riding on a public sidewalk who was injured by a car exiting a driveway. Id. 
at 596. The plaintiff claimed that a 4 foot fence obstructed views and contributed to the 
accident; the landowner claimed no duty of care owed to the bicyclist. Id. The Echorst court 
held that the landowner owed no duty and explained: 
[where] obstructing objects are located on private property 
abutting a public way, the landowner has no duty to users of the 
public way and liability does not attach as a matter of law." Id. 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Echorst court's holding that no duty attached was, 
inter alia, a policy determination balancing the burden on private property owners to remove 
all possible obstructions. 
An even more compelling public policy consideration is set forth in Pulkav.Edelman, 
358 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1976), where that court held that not only is there no basis for the 
imposition of a duty on a property owner owed no duty to prevent the negligence of a driver 
exiting its parking lot, but that it would be an impractical and unbearable burden to impose. 
9 
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In Pulka, the court of highest resort in New York addressed whether the operators of a 
parking garage were liable in negligence for an injury to a pedestrian struck by a car while 
it was being driven out of the garage and across an adjacent sidewalk, not by a garage 
employee, but by a patron of the garage." Id at 1020. 
The Pulka court noted that "[i]t is undisputed that the driver of the car owed a duty 
to the plaintiff," and therefore a cause of action from whom recovery could be had even if 
no remedy was available from the landowner. Id at 1021. After noting that the relationship 
between landowner and pedestrian in this circumstance was "at best somewhat tenuous," the 
court stated that it would be unfair to impose a duty on the garage with respect to the acts of 
its patrons leaving the garage in automobiles. Id at 1022. Further, pedestrians "may seek 
legal redress [from the drivers] and are not without a remedy." Id. Additionally, the court 
explained that whether a duty exists should not be based on foreseeability because 
foreseeability "should not be confused with duty." Id Foreseeability "should not be 
confused with duty [because] foreseeability is applicable to determine the scope of duty -
only after it has been determined that there is a duty." Id. (emphasis added). 
As a matter of public policy, the Pulka court addressed the practical implications of 
imposing a duty on every property owner with property abutting a public way: 
Think . . . of the parking facilities at some hotels, office 
buildings and shopping centers. The burden cast upon the 
operators of these parking establishments in order to discharge 
their responsibilities in respect to patron-operated vehicles 
beyond the confines of their properties would be an impractical 
and unbearable one. More importantly, there is no basis in the 
law for the imposition of this burden. 
Id. at 1023. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. There is no special relationship between Plaintiff and Bank of Utah 
Utah Courts have explained that to impose a duty of care on a property owner where 
negligence by omission is alleged, a special relationship must exist between the parties. 
"Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirmative duty to care for another." Beach v. 
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). 'The law imposes upon one party an 
affirmative duty to act only when certain special relationships exist between the parties." Id. 
"The essence of a special relationship is dependence by one party upon the other or mutual 
dependence between the parties." Id Further, "'[t]hese [special] relationships generally 
arise when one assumes responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of his or her 
opportunities for self-protection.'" Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, flO, 125 P.3d 
906 (quoting Beach, 726 P.2d at 415). Whether or not a duty exists is also "'an expression 
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff 
is [or is not] entitled to protection." Webb, 2005 UT 80 at % 9. 
It is especially true that a special relationship must exist when the alleged duty is 
based upon an alleged omission by the defendant as instructed the Utah Supreme Court in 
Webb: "[A]n omission or failure to act can generally give rise to [a duty] only in the 
presence of some external circumstance-a special relationship." Id. at ff 9,10. 
In the instant case there is no such special relationship between Defendant Bank of 
Utah and Plaintiff. As a bicyclist who was injured by a third party while using the public 
sidewalk in front of the bank, there was no special relationship. In fact, in this case where 
11 
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the Plaintiff was merely passing by on a public sidewalk, and injured by a third party 
motorist, there is no special relationship to a nearby landowner. This is especially true 
because the injury was not caused by any instrumentality on the Bank's property, but by the 
admitted negligence of a third party automobile driver. 
Plaintiff has misconstrued case law in an effort to impose a duty on Bank of Utah. 
The only time a property owner owes a duty is when an individual trips or falls over a 
hazardous condition or object on the property upon which the person is walking. That is not 
what happened in this case. Because there is no special relationship between the parties to 
justify setting aside the general rule that no duty is owed, and because the facts of plaintiffs' 
cited cases and other support, including Restatement (Second) of Torts §368 are completely 
factually inapposite to the case at hand, Plaintiffs attempts are unavailing. 
Utah is not the only state holding that at most, in a case where negligence by omission 
is alleged, there must be a "special relationship," to impose a duty. Other jurisdictions follow 
this approach. In addition to concluding that no duty was owed to prevent a negligent 
driver's behavior, the Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365 (111. 1991), supra, court also 
explained that whether a duty exists "depends on whether the parties stood in such a 
relationship to one another that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant...." Id. In 
concluding that no special relationship existed between the plaintiff and landowner sufficient 
to impose a duty on the landowner, the Illinois Supreme Court pointed out that "plaintiff 
never entered defendant's property, nor did he come into contact with any condition on 
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defendant's land." Id. at 1367. The facts of this case, e.g. Plaintiff was injured by the actions 
of a third party tort-feasor while utilizing a public sidewalk not owned by the Bank of Utah, 
are no different. In fact, as the Plaintiff has also argued in this case, the Ziemba court 
explained that Section 368 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was inapplicable under this 
circumstance. Id This is because "Section 368 presents the well-established common law 
rule that a landowner's only duty towards travelers on an adjacent highway is to keep his land 
free from conditions which are unreasonably dangerous to such travelers who may come into 
contact with the condition." Id. Because the plaintiff was not injured by a condition or 
instrumentality on the land, but was injured by the vehicle driven by a third party, 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 did not apply to impose a duty. 
New York has also explained that whether a duty may possibly exist is largely 
dependent on whether a special relationship exists. In Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019 
(N.Y. 1976), supra, the New York court pointed out that whether a duty was owed depended 
on "the relationship of a garage to pedestrians who use the sidewalk across which cars leave 
the garage imposes a duty on the garage to take some precautions to protect pedestrians from 
its patrons." Id. at 1021-22 (emphasis added). 
Finally, in Gelbman v. Second NatT Bank of Warren, 458 N.E.2d 1262, 1263-64 
(Ohio 1984), the court held that no duty was owed by the landowner to a pedestrian where 
the pedestrian was a business invitee who left the premises of the landowner onto a public 
thoroughfare where she was injured by a vehicle driven by a third party. This was because 
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such a pedestrian may seek legal redress from the driver, and to impose a duty on the 
landowner in this circumstance "would be to create an unnecessary extension of a duty 
beyond the limits required under the law of negligence as we know it." Id. (quoting Pulka, 
358N.E.2datl019). 
C. The trial court properly applied the above case law to correctly conclude 
that Bank of Utah owed no duty to plaintiff 
Applying these cases to the instant case, Bank of Utah owed no duty to Plaintiff. The 
Plaintiff in the instant case was injured by a vehicle negligently driven by a third party that 
was exiting the landowner's property. Like the plaintiff in Ziemba, Plaintiff in this case 
"never entered defendant's property, nor did he come into contact with any condition on 
defendant's land." Plaintiff in the instant case was not injured by a condition or 
instrumentality on the land, but was injured by the vehicle driven by a third party. As a 
matter of policy, the usual justification for imposing landowner liability is not present in this 
case because the automobile driver, not the landowner, is in the best position to prevent the 
injury. Indeed, any attempt to create a relationship between the Plaintiff and the Bank under 
these circumstances is at best tenuous. As both Geldman and Pulka warned, imposing a duty 
on the Bank of Utah "would be to create an unnecessary extension of a duty beyond the limits 
required under the law of negligence." Gelbman, 458 N.E.2dat 1263-64 (quoting Pulka, 358 
N.E.2d at 1019). Moreover, Plaintiff is not left without a remedy; he recovered from the 
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driver of the automobile in this case. (R. 031-34.)2 In short, there is no special relationship 
between Plaintiff and Bank of Utah sufficient to impose a duty in this circumstance where 
the plaintiff, as a pedestrian passing by the landowner's property on a public sidewalk, was 
injured by an automobile driven by a third party. 
II. Plaintiffs attempt to apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts and case law 
involving contact with a condition fails to support imposing a duty on Bank of 
Utah 
Because courts have not imposed a duty on a property owner under circumstances 
similar to those in this case, plaintiff has attempted to argue that the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts "provide[s] for [Bank of Utah's] liability." (Br. of PL at 7). Plaintiff has likewise 
cited several cases which he argues, although not involving situations where an individual 
is exiting private property, nonetheless claims support imposing a duty on Bank of Utah. 
However, Plaintiffs cited sections and case law do not support his contention because they 
deal with factual scenarios completely inapposite to the present instance. 
A. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 is inapplicable because Plaintiff was 
not injured through contact with a condition on the Bank's land 
The injury at issue in this case occurred when Plaintiff was struck by Defendant 
2
 It is undisputed that Defendant Phitsnoukanh was negligent. (See Undisputed 
Statement of Fact 9.) Moreover, after making an offer of judgment for full policy limits 
of $25,000, Defendant Phitsnoukanh settled Plaintiffs claim against her. (See R. 0014, 
16-17; R. 0031-34; see also Brunswick Realty Co.v. University Inv. Co.. 134 P. 608 
(Utah 1913) (explaining that a plea tender that judgment may be entered against a party is 
an admission of liability that leaves open only the question of the amount of such 
liability). 
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Phitsnoukanh who breached her statutory duty of care to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was not on Bank 
of Utah's property, rather he was using a public sidewalk. He was not injured because he 
came into contact with a condition or instrumentality on the Bank's property. Despite these 
facts, Plaintiff nevertheless argues that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 imposes a duty 
on Bank of Utah to protect him from the acts of a negligent third party. (Br. of PL at 6-8). 
Section 368 of the Restatement (Second) is completely inapplicable because Plaintiffs 
injuries were not caused by "contact with" "an excavation or other artificial condition" on 
the land as required. 
Section 368 reads as follows: 
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an excavation 
or other artificial condition so near an existing highway that he realizes or 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others accidentally 
brought into contact with such condition while traveling with reasonable 
care upon the highway, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused 
to persons who (a) are traveling on the highway, or (b) foreseeably deviate 
from it in the ordinary course of travel. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 (2d. ed. 1965) (emphasis added). In this case Plaintiff 
was not injured through contact with a condition on the land; rather, Plaintiff was injured 
when he collided with an automobile driven by a third party while bicycling on the public 
sidewalk. 
Cases from other jurisdictions agree with this position. For example, in Ziemba, 
supra, the court explained that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 was inapplicable where 
a bicyclist was injured by an automobile driven by a third party instead of through contact 
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with a condition on the land. 566 N.E.2d at 1367. The Ziemba court clearly distinguished 
a situation involving a bicyclist, as in this case, with other situations where Section 368 may 
apply: 
Section 368 presents the well-established common law rule that 
a landowner's only duty towards travelers on an adjacent 
highway is to keep his land free from conditions which are 
unreasonably dangerous to such travelers who may come into 
contact with the condition. 
Id. Because the plaintiff was not injured by a condition or instrumentality on the land, but 
was injured by the vehicle driven by a third party, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 did 
not apply to impose a duty. Id, 
Similarly, in Shaw v. Soo Line Railroad Co.. 463 N.W.2d 51 (Iowa 1990), the court 
concluded that where automobile passengers were killed in a collision with a train, 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 was inapplicable to impose a duty of care on a 
landowner near the railroad crossing. Id. at 54-55. The plaintiffs' "reliance on Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 368 [was] misplaced [because] the hazard addressed by section 368 
is . . . the risk that a traveler will come into contact with a condition on the real estate." Id. 
The Restatement did not apply because "no physical contact was made by [the plaintiffs] 
vehicle and the creamery buildings." Id. Rather, the plaintiff collided with a train. 
Accordingly, Section 368 does not apply to the instant case because Plaintiff was not injured 
by being brought into contact with a condition or instrumentality on the Bank of Utah's land. 
Rather, Plaintiff was injured when he collided with an automobile driven by a third party 
while bicycling on the public sidewalk. 
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B. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343 and 343A are likewise inapplicable 
Plaintiff has also argued that Section 343 and Section 343A of the Restatement 
(Second) "impose[d] a duty upon a landowner if the traveler will either not discover the 
danger, or, having discovered it, cannot be expected to reasonably avoid it." (Br. of PI. at 
7). To support his contention, Plaintiff cites Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d. 266. 
However, Hale involves an invitee as opposed to a "passerby" on a public sidewalk. In Hale, 
the Utah Supreme Court explained that both §343 and §343 A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts "defines the duty of care a landowner owes an invitee." Id. at f 14. Likewise, the 
law does not impose a duty on Bank of Utah in this case because Plaintiff, as a passerby on 
a public sidewalk, was not an invitee.3 
3
 In fact, because the Plaintiff was not a land entrant and not injured by any 
instrumentality on the bank's premises, no duty was owed to him as either an invitee, 
licensee, or trespasser. Utah continues to adhere to the land entrant classifications of 
invitee, licensee, or trespasser. See, e.g., Kessler v. Mortenson, 2000 UT 95, ]f 16, 16 
P.3d 1225. Plaintiff was none of these, and therefore owed no duty of care by the bank. 
Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586 (Utah 1993) is instructive on this point. In 
Cannon, no duty of care was owed by the University to two plaintiff pedestrians because 
they were not injured on the premises of the university. The pedestrians were injured by 
an automobile while walking to a university event. They were not on university property 
when the accident occurred, but were walking from a university parking lot along a state-
owned road. Id. at 587. The pedestrians claimed they were owed a duty as invitees. Id. 
at 589. The court disagreed, noting that in order to be owed a duty as a land entrant 
invitee, "one must not only be an invitee, but must also be on the premises of the 
defendant. Id "[Bjecause [the pedestrians] were not on University property when the 
accident occurred, they were not business invitees of the University at that time," and 
therefore owed no duty by the university. Id.; cf Schultz v. Quintana, 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 
1978) (imposing duty by land owner to land entrant because "[plaintiff] ceased to be a 
traveler when he abandoned the roadway and entered [the landowner's] land"); Largosa 
v.Ford Motor Co., 708 N.E.2d 1219 (111. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that landowner owed 
(continued...) 
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Similarly, the issue of foreseeability and other remedies goes to breach of a duty, as 
opposed to whether a duty exists in the first place. Plaintiff alleges that Bank of Utah should 
owe a duty to pedestrians or bicyclists on the sidewalk like himself because, he claims, Bank 
of Utah should have foreseen the potential danger of the exit. (R. 003; Compl. 1fl[18,19,25). 
In his brief, Plaintiff argues that the Bank should have done more than "placing a stop sign 
near the sidewalk" for patrons exiting the drive-thru. (Br. of PI. at 10). These allegations of 
foreseeable possibilities go towards the question of breach, however, not duty. 
Whether a party should have done something more is a question of whether the party 
acted within the standard of care or breached the standard of care - after the issue of duty has 
been decided, not a consideration in determining whether a duty should be imposed as a 
matter of law or judicial policy. See, e.g., Echorst, 288 A.D.2d at 596, supra (noting that 
foreseeability and what more a party could have done to prevent such foreseen risks "merely 
determines the scope of the duty once it is determined to exist" as a matter of law or policy) 
(internal quotation omitted)); Pu]ka, 358 N.E.2d at 1022-23, supra (noting that foreseeability 
and whether additional "precautionary measures" could have been taken are "applicable to 
3
 (...continued) 
no duty to passing motorist because "plaintiffs never set foot on defendant's property and 
never contemplated visiting defendant's [business, but] were merely among the many 
motorists who passed by defendant's business every day [.]"); Applying this reasoning 
from Cannon to the instant case, Plaintiff is owed no duty of care by the Bank because he 
was not an invitee, licensee, or trespasser injured by an instrumentality on bank property. 
Rather, Plaintiff was injured while riding on a public sidewalk by an automobile driven 
by a third party. 
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determine the scope of duty - only after it has been determined that there is a duty"). As the 
court explained in Zimmerman v. Netemeyer, "'[fjoreseeability] enters into the negligence 
format only after the court has concluded that, at the time of the occurrence in question, the 
defendant was under a duty to guard against injury to the plaintiff" 462 N.E.2d at 507 
(emphasis added). See also, Webb, 2005 UT 80 at ff 9-10 (explaining that in order to 
impose a duty in Utah, a special relationship must exist when the alleged duty is based upon 
an alleged omission by the defendant). Before addressing such possibilities, however, it 
must be decided whether a duty is owed as a matter of law or judicial policy. In this case, 
because of the tenuous, nearly non-existent relationship between the Plaintiff and Bank of 
Utah - where the Plaintiff is a bicyclist on a public sidewalk who was struck by an 
automobile driven by a third party, and the Bank is a landowner whose property abuts the 
sidewalk where the accident occurred - no duty is owed by the Bank to the Plaintiff. 
C. The cases cited by Plaintiff involving conditions on land where an 
individual was injured through contact with an artificial condition are 
inapplicable 
Not only does Plaintiff incorrectly attempt to argue that Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§368 imposes a duty on Bank of Utah, but he likewise cites numerous cases that are 
completely inapplicable to the case at hand. For example, Plaintiff advances Schultz v. 
Qumtana, 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978), and Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 159 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1945), for the proposition that a landowner is under an obligation not to cause unreasonable 
harm to others in the vicinity and that "[a] pedestrian has the right to assume that the 
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sidewalk is in a reasonably safe condition, and to act upon that assumption." (Br. of PI. at 
7, 9). However, both cases are inapplicable because they involved injury to a plaintiff 
through contact with an artificial condition on the land - an actual instrumentality on the land 
that cause the injury when the plaintiff came into contact with it; not injury caused by a car 
driven by a third party. 
In Schubachu the plaintiff tripped over worn rivets that stuck up above the sidewalk 
level from a "metal trap door" in the sidewalk. Schubach, 159 P.2d at 151. In that case, 
however, the duty was created by leaving the sidewalk in a defective and hazardous condition 
by a municipality which owes a duty to pedestrians to maintain sidewalks in safe condition. 
Id. at 272. Similarly, the plaintiff in Schultz tripped and fell over a stake that the owner had 
placed to mark the property line. Schultz, 576 P.2d at 856. Interestingly, because the 
plaintiff in Schultz had "abandoned the roadway and entered [the landowner's property 
without permission]... [he] was a trespasser" to whom a lesser duty was owed. Id. Minimal 
duties are owed to land entrants who are trespassers when a dangerous instrumentality on the 
land causes the injury. No such scenario exists in the case at hand. In particular, the 
Plaintiffs injury was not due to contact by the Plaintiff with a condition on the land. The 
Plaintiff did not trip over an instrumentality on the sidewalk; rather Plaintiff was injured by 
an automobile driven by a third party. Thus, Schultz and Schubach are inapposite. 
Similarly, Plaintiff relies heavily on Boggsv.Lay, 164 S. W.3d 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005), 
in which the Missouri Court of Appeals imposed a duty on the landowner, ADM, who 
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permitted delivery trucks to park on the public road. The Missouri court's decision was a 
unique circumstance as an exception to the general rule of no liability because the landowner 
created a hazardous condition on the public roadway by affirmative actions and not 
omissions. In Boggs, ADM purchased a vacant lot as a waiting facility for the trucks, but on 
the day of the accident the lot was closed resulting in the trucks using the street as the waiting 
area as ADM had done before the vacant lot was purchased. Id. at 13. A child exiting a 
residential driveway near the ADM facility rode between trucks delivering soybeans, only 
to be injured by a truck hired by ADM. This hired motorist was going the wrong direction 
down the street, as instructed by ADM. Id. at 11-13. The Missouri court first noted the 
general rule that "an abutting property owner is under no duty to maintain a public road in 
a safe condition." Id. at 16. The court nevertheless explained that because the dangerous 
condition arose "through the owner's affirmative actions and not his omissions," ADM owed 
a duty to the passerby. Id at 17. 
The instant case is different. First, the Plaintiff was not injured by a vehicle hired by 
the Bank of Utah - Phitsnoukanh was not hired by the bank. Second, Bank of Utah did not 
instruct Phitsnoukanh or other drivers to break the law thereby creating a dangerous 
condition on the roadway itself. Third, the alleged negligence by Bank of Utah was one of 
omission, while the negligence in Boggs was one of creating a dangerous condition on the 
roadway "through the owner's affirmative actions and not his omissions." Where the alleged 
negligence is one of omission, the duty must exist by virtue of a special relationship. Webb, 
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2005 UT 80 at ^ J10, supra. As stated above, there is no special relationship between Plaintiff 
and Bank of Utah. 
The remaining cases briefly mentioned or string-cited by Plaintiff on pages 15 to 19 
of his brief are also inapplicable. (Br of. PI. at 15-19.) All of the cases relied upon by 
Plaintiff involve injury due to actual contact by a plaintiff with an instrumentality or 
hazardous condition on the land. None of the cases involve an injury resulting from a vehicle 
driven by a third party on the public sidewalk or thoroughfare in front of a defendant 
landowner and alleged omission by the landowner to do something to prevent the accident.4 
4
 See O'Connell v. Roper Electric Co.. Inc.. 498 S.W.2d 847, 849, 852-53 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1973) (invitee slip and fell on an ice-covered driveway used as a walkway to a 
business office); Love v. Clam Box, Inc., 232 N.Y.S.2d 924, 925-26 (N.Y. 1962) (actual 
contact by the plaintiff with fresh concrete); Krug v. Wanner, 145 A.2d 612, 613-15 (N.J. 
1958) (trip and fall on a steel door covering the street entrance to the cellar); Conrad v. 
Walker Bank & Trust Co.. 542 P.2d 1090, 1090 (Utah 1975) (actual contact by the 
plaintiff bicyclist with a hole in the lawn of the planter strip between the sidewalk and the 
street that the landowner had a duty to maintain); Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, 
Uf 1-5, 67 P.3d 1017 (plaintiffs rode their bicycles into a ditch on the end of a planter strip 
between the sidewalk and the street); McKinley v. Fanning, 595 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Idaho 
1979) (plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on sidewalk that was created by water dripping off 
of awning installed by abutting landowner); Tripp v. Granite Holding Co., 450 P.2d 99, 
100 (Utah 1969) (plaintiff tripped and fell on "a defect in a public sidewalk" and the court 
held no duty was owed by abutting landowner); Key v. Lerner Shops of Colorado, Inc., 
472 P.2d 752, 753 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff fell on icy sidewalk that was allegedly 
created by owner); Herndon v. Arco Petroleum Co., 536 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Nev. 1975) 
(plaintiff slipped on snow and ice on sidewalk); Pauley v. Newman, 2004 WY 76,1fl[2-5, 
13, 92 P.3d 819 (plaintiff slipped on snow and ice on sidewalk that was created or 
aggravated by downspout from landowner's home). 
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III. There is no statutory duty owed by Bank of Utah to Plaintiff who was using a 
public sidewalk 
The trial court concluded that Defendant Phitsnoukanh had a statutory duty to yield 
the right of way to Plaintiff who was using a public sidewalk. Likewise, the trial court 
concluded that the Legislature imposed a duty on the Plaintiff to operate his bycicle on a 
sidewalk at a reasonable speed. In the complete absence of any statutory provision imposing 
a duty on a property owner such as Bank of Utah, the trial court also correctly concluded that 
the Bank did not owe any statutory duty to protect pedestrians/bicyclists using a public 
sidewalk.5 
Plaintiff has argued that Utah Code Ann. §41-6-19(1) places on a landowner such as 
Bank of Utah "the affirmative duty to remove obstructions from his property." (B. of PL at 
5
 With regard to duty, it is clear that defendant Phitsnoukanh had a duty to yield to 
the plaintiff and that she breached that duty. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-80.5 (2003) provides 
that "the operator of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the right-of way to any 
pedestrian and all other traffic on the sidewalk." Further, the Legislature has imposed a 
heightened duty on drivers such as defendant Phitsnoukanh: "The driver of a vehicle 
emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway within a business or residence 
district shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the 
sidewalk area extending across such alley, building entrance, road or driveway, or in the 
event there is no sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the street to be entered 
where the driver has a view of approaching traffic thereon. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-100 
(2003) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, Plaintiff has a duty to operate his bicycle on a sidewalk at a reasonable 
speed and only when not prohibited by ordinance. See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-87.3 
(2003). 
Importantly, while these duties clearly relate to situations such as plaintiff riding 
on the sidewalk, and expressly contemplate a driver exiting an "alley, building entrance, 
road or driveway," (See §41-6-100 (2003)), the Legislature did not impose a similar duty 
on a landowner. 
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11). It is obvious that this statute addresses removal of vegetation as opposed to the alleged 
obstruction - the bank building itself. Section 41-6-19 cannot be reasonably interpreted to 
require removal of an entire building. Additionally, the doctrine of ejusdem generis when 
applied to the statute only requires removal of vegetation, and the Plaintiff is not alleging that 
Bank of Utah should have removed vegetation. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19 does not require removal of an entire building, 
rather, it only requires removal of vegetation 
First, Section 41-6-19(1) cannot reasonably be interpreted to require removal of an 
entire building to ensure views to automobile drivers are unobstructed. The version of 
Section 41-6-19(1) in effect on the date of the accident in March 2003 reads as follows: 
The owner of real property shall remove from his property any 
tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of it, which, by 
obstructing the view of any operator, constitutes a traffic hazard. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19(l)(2003) (Addendum A)(emphasis added). Plaintiff claims that 
the bank building itself is the obstruction that prevented the driver from seeing him. The 
statute cannot reasonably be interpreted to require removal of the building, or a part of it, to 
improve driver vision. If the statute were applicable, which it is not, it would require every 
building adjoining a sidewalk to be removed. Moreover, the building cannot be "remove[d]." 
The statute clearly cannot be applied in this way and certainly could not have been what was 
intended by the Legislature. 
In this regard, the Utah Court of Appeals in Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 
556, 559 (Ut. App. 1992) explained that Section 41-6-19 was " to effect removal of foliage 
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that obstructs the view of motor vehicle operators." Plaintiff incorrectly argues that Jones 
v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556 (Ut. App. 1992), supports the imposition of a duty to 
remove the obstruction itself, e.g. the bank building. (Br. of PI. at 11.) Jones is inapposite. 
It addresses the statutory duty of a municipality to instruct a landowner to remove vegetation. 
That said, Jones actually supports Bank of Utah's position that no duty was owed, inasmuch 
as Jones held that there is no Utah common law duty owed by a landowner to maintain 
unobstructed visibility at an intersection. In Jones, a motorcyclist plaintiff collided with an 
automobile on a public road. The plaintiff sued the automobile driver and the city, claiming, 
inter alia, that the city owed a statutory duty to notify and order the landowner on the corner 
of the intersection to remove the vegetation. Id, at 558. In affirming summary judgment for 
the City, the Court of Appeals held that no duty was owed by the City to require the 
landowner to remove the vegetation, even if it obstructed vision. Id. This was because such 
a duty was not owed by a municipality without an engineering and traffic investigation study 
concluding that a hazard existed. Id. at 559. Second, the court of appeals held the City owed 
no common law duty to remove the vegetation, even if that vegetation obstructed views at 
the intersection Id. at 560. Applied to the instant case, Jones does not impose either a 
statutory or common law duty on Bank of Utah. 
B. Section 41-6-19 only requires removal of vegetation, consistent with the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis 
Second, applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the statute does not require removal 
of non-vegetative obstructions - in this circumstance, the bank building. 'The doctrine of 
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ejusdem generis applies in instances where an inexhaustive enumeration of particular or 
specific terms is followed by a general term or terms that suggest a class." State v. A.T., 
2001 UT 82, f 12, 34 P.2d 228. "The doctrine declares that in order to give meaning to the 
general term, the general term is understood as restricted to include things of the same kind, 
class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is something to show 
a contrary intent." Id. (citing, inter alia, 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 47:17-18 (6th ed.2000)). The doctrine applies in this case. 
The statute requires removal of three specific things followed by a general term: "The 
owner of real property shall remove from his property any tree, plant, shrub, or other 
obstruction . . . ." Utah Code Section 41-6-19(1) (2003) (emphasis added). Applying the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis to the statute, an "obstruction" that must be removed must be of 
the same class or character as trees, plants or shrubs; in other words, it must be vegetation. 
Plaintiff does not contend that a tree, plant, shrub or other type of vegetation obstructed Ms. 
Phitsnoukanh's vision. Rather, Plaintiff claims the bank building itself is the obstruction. 
This is clearly an unreasonable and implausible extension of the statute. 
The trial court correctly concluded that there was no statutory duty owed by Bank of 
Utah to protect Plaintiff, a bicyclist using a public sidewalk who was injured by a third party 
motorist. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court properly concluded that Bank of Utah owed no duty of care to 
Plaintiff. Other jurisdictions agree that no duty is owed by a property owner such as Bank 
of Utah to protect a bicyclist on a public sidewalk who is injured by a motorist who breached 
a duty to stop. This decision is supported by Utah common law and sound policy. Moreover, 
Plaintiffs attempt to apply Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 368 fails because the facts 
of this case do not involve actual contact with a dangerous instrumentality or hazardous 
condition on the land itself. Plaintiffs attempt to apply the Restatement Sections 343 and 
343A involving an invitee is also inapplicable because Plaintiff was not an invitee. Finally, 
there is no statutory duty imposed on the Bank to protect Plaintiff, a bicyclist using a public 
sidewalk from a negligent motorist; and any attempt to argue that Bank of Utah owes a duty 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 41-6-19 cannot prevail because that statute requires removal 
of vegetation, and it cannot reasonably interpreted to require removal of an entire building. 
DATED this of August, 2006. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
S. BaipeTMorgan 
Nathan S. Morris 
Michael K. Woolley 
Attorneys for Appellee and Defendant Bank of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that eight (8) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
instrument, including one original, were filed with the court and two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing instrument were served via U.S. mail on this 1 T day of August, 
2006, addressed to the following: 
J. Paul Stockdale 
STOCKDALE & BRIDGES 
795 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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41-6-16 MOTOR VEHICLES 764 
41-6-16, Uniform appl icat ion of chapter — Effect of 
local ordinances. 
The provisions of th i s chap te r a re applicable and uniform 
throughout this s ta te and in all of its political subdivisions 
and municipali t ies. A local au thor i ty may not enact or enforce 
any ru le or ordinance in conflict wi th the provisions of th is 
chapter. Local au thor i t ies may, however, adopt ordinances 
consistent wi th this chapter , and addit ional traffic ordinances 
which are not in conflict wi th this chapter. 1987 
41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authorities — Traf-
fic-control device affecting state highway — 
Necessity of erecting traffic-control devices. 
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local 
authorities, with respect to highways under their jurisdiction 
and within the reasonable exercise of police power, from: 
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or 
parking; 
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or 
official traffic-control devices; 
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assem-
blages on the highways; 
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for 
use by traffic moving in one direction under Section 
41-6-60; 
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public 
parks, which supersede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed 
limits; 
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or 
designating any intersection or junction of roadways as a 
stop or yield intersection or junction; 
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 72-7-
408; 
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring 
the registration and inspection of them, including requir-
ing a registration fee; 
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or 
specified types of vehicles; 
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 
41-6-48; 
(k) requiring written accident reports under Section 
41-6-42; 
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59; 
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-
access roadways by any class or kind of traffic under 
Section 41-6-65; 
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled 
streets by any class or kind of traffic: found to be incom-
patible with the normal and safe movement of traffic; 
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under Subsec-
tion 41-6-49(3); 
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets; 
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in 
a business district or any designated highway except in a 
crosswalk under Section 41-6-77; 
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at unmarked cross-
walks under Section 41-6-82.10; 
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts; 
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, . sleds, 
skateboards, and other toy vehicles; 
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or experimental 
ordinances as necessary to cover emergencies or special 
conditions; 
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding 
maximum speed limits; or 
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically 
authorized by this chapter. 
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official 
traffic-control device at any location which requires the traffic 
on any state highway to stop before entering or crossing any 
intersecting highway unless approval m writing has first been 
obtained from the Department of Transportation. 
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f), 
(g), (i), (j), (1), (m), (n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official 
traffic-control devices giving notice of the local traffic ordi-
nances are erected upon or at the entrances to the highway or 
part of it affected as is appropriate. 2001 
41-6-17.5. Quasi-public roads and parking a r e a s — Lo-
cal ordinances. 
(1) As used in this section, "quasi-public road or parking 
area" means a privately-owned and maintained road or park-
ing area that is generally held open for use of the public for 
purposes of vehicular travel or parking. 
(2) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance pro-
vide that a quasi-public road or parking area within the 
city or county is subject to this chapter. 
(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under this section 
without: 
(i) a public hearing; and 
(ii) the agreement of a majority of the owners of 
the quasi-public road or parking area involved. 
(3) The depa r tmen t is not required under t h i s section to 
pat ro l or enforce any provisions of th is chapter on any quasi-
public road or parking area , bu t is required to enforce those 
provisions of this chapter applicable to private p roper ty other 
t h a n under this section. 1999 
41-6-18. Right of real property owner to regulate traf-
fic. 
This chapter does not prevent the owner of r ea l property 
used by the public for purposes of vehicular t rave l by permis-
sion of the owner and not as m a t t e r of r ight from prohibi t ing 
t he use, or from requir ing other or different or additional 
conditions other t han those specified in this chapter , or other-
wise regula t ing the use as preferred by the owner, except as 
y be required under Section 41-6-17.5. 1988 
41-6-19. Removal of plants or other obstructions im-
pairing view — Notice to owner — Penalty. 
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his 
property any tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of 
it, which, by obstructing the view of any operator, constitutes 
a traffic hazard. 
(2) When the Department of Transportation or any local 
authority determines upon the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that a traffic hazard exists, it shall notify 
the owner and order that the hazard be removed within ten 
days. 
(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic hazard 
within ten days is a class C misdemeanor. 1987 
41-6-19.5. Volunteers may be authorized to enforce 
certain parking provisions. 
(1) Any law enforcement agency authorized to enforce park-
ing laws in this state may appoint volunteers to issue citations 
for violations of: 
(a) the provisions of Subsections 41-la-414(3) and (4) 
related to parking for a person with a disability; 
(b) any municipal or county accessible parking privi-
leges ordinance for a person with a disability; or 
(c) the provisions of Subsection 41-6-103.5(4) related to 
parking in a school bus parking zone. 
(2) A volunteer appointed under this section must be at 
least 21 years of age. 
(3) The law enforcement agency appointing a volunteer 
may establish any other qualification for the volunteer that 
the agency finds desirable. 
(4) A volunteer may not issue citations until the volunteer 
has received training from the appointing law enforcemen 
agency. 
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